The League of Arab States and Its Role in the Arab World by Tayeb, Lutfi M.
University of North Dakota 
UND Scholarly Commons 
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects 
8-1-1974 
The League of Arab States and Its Role in the Arab World 
Lutfi M. Tayeb 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Tayeb, Lutfi M., "The League of Arab States and Its Role in the Arab World" (1974). Theses and 
Dissertations. 3438. 
https://commons.und.edu/theses/3438 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator 
of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 
AND
ITS ROLE IN THE ARAB WORLD
by
Lutfi M. Tayeb
Bachelor of Arts, University of Delaware 1972
A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts




Title The League of Arab States and its Role in the Arab World
Department Political Science__________________________________
Degree Master of Art__________________________________________
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that 
the library of this university shall make it freely available for inspec­
tion. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly 
purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work 
or, in his absence, by the Chairman of the Department or the Dean of the 
Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or 
other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be 
allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due 
recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota 





I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Henry J.
Tomasek, former Chairman of the Political Science Department, Dr.
Stephen C. Markovich, Chairman of the Political Science Department, Dr. 
Ronald E. Pynn, professor of political science, and Dr. Robert P. Wilkins, 
professor of History for their suggestions and criticisms in the writing 
of this paper, and for their service as my advisory committee.
A sincere thank you is expressed to G. Erdmann, and Professor 
John B. McCollough of Greenwood, Delaware, for their encouragement, help 




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................ '.................................  iii
ABSTRACT..........................................................  v
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1
The A r a b s ...................................................   1
Arab Nationalism ............................................ 3
The League of Arab S t a t e s ...................................  7
II. ARAB MONARCHS AND PRESIDENTS.................................. 13
III. ARAB UNITY AND D I S U N I T Y ................................ .. . 23
IV. THE ARAB LEAGUE: FAILURE AND S U C C E S S .........................  30
V. CONCLUSION...................................................  46
APPENDICES........................................................  49
Appendix A ..................................................  49
Appendix B ......................................  52
Appendix C ..................................................  59
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................  64
iv
ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with the Arab League and its role in the 
Arab world. Its primary concern is with Arab unity, the Palestine 
problem, Arab disputes, and cooperation among Arab states.
Since the establishment of the League in 1945 as an organization 
through which the various Arab states could work together by voluntary 
cooperation in all spheres, and as a means toward achievement of Arab 
unity, many important developments in the Arab world, both in the internal 
and external fields took place, and led to instability in the Arab world.
The political and social revolutions in the Arab world have led to 
power struggles and divisions among Arab leaders, and created inter-Arab 
rivalries and disputes. Because of these the League's activities have 
been adversely affected, and the League has been unable to achieve the 
goals for which it was created.
The League, since its birth in 1945, has not succeeded in saving 
its members from the loss of Palestine, or from the internal intrigues, 
or from the Baghdad Pact, or from tensions between its members. It 
showed its impotence in the Arab world for its inability to play politi­
cally any useful role in time of crisis.
Despite its ineffectiveness politically, due to political divisions 
among its members as well as the turbulent conditions prevailing in the 
Arab world, the League has nevertheless been effective to some extent in
v
cultural and economic measures as the league has obtained the commitments 
of its members for increased cooperation. And, the League will continue 
to function voluntarily as long as the Arab leaders are willing to 
cooperate. It will continue to focus on the common hostility of its 
member states toward Israel as it has frequently gone on record with 
expression of its rejection of the legitimacy of the state of Israel and 
with calls for a return of the Palestinian refugees to their former 
homes, and it will continue to reflect the balance among Arab governments 






The Arabs, an ancient people, who claim and trace their ancestry to 
the Patriarch Abraham through his firstborn son Ismael, whose mother was 
an Agyptian, crossed Africa at some unknown time and mixed their blood 
with Hamitic people. Descendants of the Arabs have included the Phoen­
icians, the Canaanites, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Hebrews, 
as well as other tribal groups.
Through many centuries, the Arabs were chiefly nomads, leading 
flocks and herds from pasture to pasture; later, they dwelt and settled 
in communities in southwest Arabia, in the land called Yemen. About 
3500 B.C. some of the Arabs migrated northeastward into the Tigris- 
Europhrates Valley, while others pushed along the Red Sea coast into Syria 
and Palestine. "Their descendants had lived in Palestine for 2000 years 
before Moses led the Hebrew tribes through Sinai to the banks of 
Jordan.
In the year 570 A.D., the Arabic Prophet Muhammad was born in Mecca, 
Arabia. About 613 A.D., he began preaching a new religion called Islam, 
proclaiming it as a religion for all men everywhere, and abolishing and
^"Anthony Nutting, The Arabs: A Narrative History (New York:
Clarkson N. Potter, 1964), p. 13.
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ignoring all ethnic distinctions or territorial boundaries in the name of 
Allah, "God". Islam grew, and spread, fast and it became a political as 
well as spiritual realm.
Muhammad led the Arabs in spreading Islam among neighboring nations. 
He died in 632, but his successors, the Caliphs, continued iiis campaign 
and succeeded in forming an Arab Empire. Their armies swept through 
Persia and northern India, reaching iixto Russia and China and the Islands 
of the Indian Ocean. Arab armies drove the Byzantines out of Syria, 
Palestine and Turkey; other armies advanced into Africa from Egypt to 
Morocco and Mauritania. They advanced through the Balkans, seized Sicily, 
occupied' Iberia, and pushed into France where they were "Stopped at Tours 
in 732 by Charles Martel.
The Arabs built an Arab Empire with armies chiefly made up of Arabs, 
and created an Arab Empire anchored on Arab lands. This empire covered 
southwest Asia, all of northern Africa, and much of southern Europe, and 
was the largest, strongest, and most advanced empire that earth had yet 
known.
In the 16th Century, the Arab nation came under the domination of the 
Ottomans. As the Ottoman Empire in turn declined in the 19th Century, 
Western imperialistic powers entered the scene, and the Arab land became 
a tempting target for Western empire builders mainly because of its 
strategic location and because of its natural resources. "During the 
nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, the ARab countries fell under
■̂ Philip K. Ilitti, History of the Arabs (London: The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1973), p. 215.
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European domination in rapid succession,Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, 
Egypt in 1882, the Sudan in 1898, Morocco in 1970-1912, Libya in 1911,
Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1918.
Through all the ages of recorded history, the empires of this 
earth have fought to hold and control the Arab world; they seized these 
territories and ruled briefly over them. Nevertheless, through all these 
experiences, the Arabs remained Arabs.
Today, the Arab world stretches more than 4000 miles, from Iraq and 
Bahrain in the Arabian Gulf across southwestern Asia to the Mediterranean. 
"It spans the continent of Africa from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic 
and probes the borders to Kenya and Mali. These vast territories are all 
Arabs ethnically, culturally, and historically."^ Within that region (5 
million square miles) in the very center of the world, live more than a 
hundred million people who call themselves Arabs, speak the Arab language, 
claim an Arab heritage, and share in the Arab aspirations.
Arab Nationalism
Since the turn of this century, the forces of Arab nationalism have 
been shaping the destinies of the Arab countries in a great variety of 
ways. At the outbreak of World War I, the Arabs aspired to rid themselves 
of Turkish rule, and to accomplish that, they declared the revolt in the 
Hijaz against the Ottomans, and joined the forces of the Allies in the
^Fayz, A. Sayegh, The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World (San 
Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 114.
“̂Eugene M. Fisher, Storm Over the Arab World (Chicago: Follett 
Publishing Co., 1972), p. 1.
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war. They believed that they were Arabs because they spoke Arabic, a 
language different from Turkish, entitling themselves to secede from the 
Ottoman Empire, and to form an Arab state in which everyone who spoke 
Arabic would be included. But, at the end of the war, the Arabs were 
rewarded by the division of their lands "by the victorious Allies and 
their imposition of 'artificial' boundaries"^ in the Arab world. The 
Arabs denounced the Western imperialist designs and dismemberment of the 
Arab nation, and called the boundaries drawn up at the peace conference 
of January 31, 1919, in Paris, arbitrary and artificial. In the years 
following World War I "Pan-Arabism was the only political doctrine to 
make headway and to exert a powerful appeal in the Arab-Speaking lands."6
On July, 1919, the General Syrian congress made up of Arab 
representatives from Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, was held in 
Damascus; its representatives produced a memorandum presented to the King 
Krane Commission,'7 in which they protested "against Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations for placing them under the League 
mandate,"8 called for the complete political independence of the Arab 
countries, rejected British and French rule in Greater Syria, opposed the
^Henry Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," The Middle East Journal, 
XVI (Winter, 1962), p. 73.
^Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern 
Studies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1970), p. 213.
^The American Section of the International Commission which was 
sent by the League of Nations to Syria for study and recommendations in 
concern to placing Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan under the 
League mandate.
O°Muhammad Kahlil, The Arab States and the Arab League (Beirut: 
Khayats, 1962), Vol. II, p. 3.
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pretentions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the 
southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and asked for a unification 
under a democratic constitutional monarchy to be headed by a King, "the 
king to be is Amir Faisal the son of Sherif Hussein Ben Ali, who had 
carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of Arab liberation, and 
fought courageously on the side of the Allies for three years."9
As the League of Nations mandate agreement of 1919 [in which rto 
Arab state or representative participated] became certain, Arab nation­
alists felt compelled to fight the mandate administrations of Britain and 
France; they pledged to expell the alien occupation powers. The Arabs 
protested and demonstrated, several strikes were proclaimed, and later 
the Arab leaders called for an armed rebellion which broke out in 1920; 
and ever since Arab warfare has continued sporadically.
On December 13, 1931, an Arab National Congress was held in 
Jerusalem. Delegates vowed that "the efforts of all the Arab countries 
shall be directed towards one objective, namely their complete indepen­
dence and unity, and the combating of every idea which aims at restricting 
(Arab) efforts to local and provincial policies."^®
Between the wars, and after the outbreak of the Second World War, 
Arab efforts were bent on securing (by war) an independence for Syria 
and Lebanon from France, the curtailment or suppression of the Zionists
^Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1968), p. 16.
■'^Muhammed I. Darwaza, Hawl Al-IIaraka Al-Arabiyya Al-Haditha 
[Concerning the Modern Arab Movement] (Sidon, Lebanon: National Press, 
1951), Vol. Ill, p. 302.
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activities in Palestine, and the establishment of a unitary or federal 
Arab state embracing the Fertile Crescent. This was the original Pan- 
Arab Programme, on which the original Pan-Arabs had always set their 
hearts.
"The Pan-Arabs desired the unification of the Arab lands; they 
desired to expel the foreigner. To them the political unity of the 
Arab world was considered a natural condition, and the present state of 
fragmentation has been attributed to outside forces, and so, "unity is 
the basic underlying form in the life of the Arab Peoples; their divisions 
into separate entities is a transient phase of recent intrusion."12 They 
believed that inside the Arab world, no natural barriers shut the Peoples 
off from one another to make any man less Arab than another; while 
linking their memories to past glories, they recalled a golden age of Arab 
greatness which is held to be true of the Arab past. Thus, Arabism and 
Pan-Arabism ideas associated with racial, linguistic, and cultural unity, 
which contributed chiefly to the development and the spread of the 
nationalistic movement, proposing a union of all Arab states.
In the summer of 1940, Rashid Ali-Al-Kailani was engaged in a 
conspiracy to take power in Iraq and align it with the Axis states.H He. 
sent an emissary to Turkey who presented to Von Papen, the German 
ambassador, a list of demands which included "the confirmation by the 12
11Ibid., p. 219.
12Nejla Izzeddin, The Arab World, Past, Present and Future (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co, 1953), p. 314.
1 OJHe took power on April 3, 1941 as he was asked by the Iraqi army to 
head the Government of National Defense which overthrew the monarchy.
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Axis of the independence of all Arab countries, the abolition of the 
Jewish National Home declared by Britain, and the recognition of Arab 
u n i t y . F r o m  that time forward the idea of Arab nationalism and Arab 
unity has had an especially powerful hold on the imaginations of all Arab 
people.
The League of Arab States
During the early years of World War II, the British government was 
determined to gain the support of the Arab leaders in Syria, Lebanon, 
and Iraq, by lending them its support for some form of regional amalgam­
ation. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden announced the new British 
policy towards the Arab countries on May 29, 1941. "The Arab world has 
made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last 
war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree 
of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out toward this unity, they 
hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go 
unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and 
economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too, 
should be strengthened. His majesty's government for their part will 
give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval."15 
This statement suggested to the Arab leaders that Britain intended to drop 
its policy of divide-and-rule in the Arab world, and that would be a good 
chance for the establishment of Arab unity.
^Al-Irfan (Sidon, Lebanon), August, 1951, p. 8.
-^George Kirk, The Middle East in the War (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1953), p. 334.
8
In March, 1943, Nuri Al-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, "circu­
lated his 'Blue Book' which suggested the 'reuniting' of Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine, and Transjordan into one state (Syria) and the formation of an 
Arab League to include any Arab states which might desire to join."-*-6
On August 24, 1943, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan addressed a letter 
to his Prime Minister, Tawfig Abu Al-Huda, concerning the question of 
Arab unity. In his letter he proposed the "Greater Syria" plan as he 
visualized "the unification of his emirate with Arab Palestine, Syria, • 
Lebanon, and possibly Iraq under his leadership."^7 However, both men 
were distrusted and unpopular within the Arab world, not only because of 
their personal ambitions but also because of their continued connection 
with the British who were mastering the creation of a Zionist state in 
Palestine by authorizing the Jewish immigration to Palestine and by 
regulating the transfer of Arab-owned land to Zionist control.
After differing reactions to and opinions of Nuri Al-Said’s Fertile 
Crescent Project and Abdullah's Greater Syria Plan by the leaders of the 
other Arab countries, Egypt's Prime Minister, Nahhas Pasha, announced on 
July 23, 1944 that he was inviting the Arab states "to a Joint Conference 
in Cairo to consider actions leading to talks on Arab Unity.
-^Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969), p. 630.
-^King Abdullah, Muthukkarat Al-Malllc Abdullah [King Abdullah 
Memoirs] (Amman, Jordan: An-Nahda Press, 1955), p. 241.
I O
Philip Ireland, "The Pact of the League of Arab States,"
American Journal of International Law, XXXIX (October 1945).
9
When the conference convened on September 25, 1944, at Alexandria 
instead of Cairo, participating delegations came from Lebanon, Egypt,
Iraq, Syria and Transjordan; observers were sent by Saudi Arabia, Yemen, 
Libya, Morocco and Palestine. From September 25 to October 7, 1944 the 
participants struggled with the problem of an appropriate structural 
organization. Three forms of political organization were debated;
1. Unitary state xtfith central political authority;
2. Federated state with a central parliament of executive committee 
with full political power over federal issues;
3. A loose confederation with emphasis on coordination and coop­
eration . -*-9
After bitter debate and much hesitation, the third form was 
selected and approved by common agreement; provided for were six committees 
concerned respectively with political, social, economic, health, cultural, 
and communications problems.
The draft agreement establishing the League of Arab States was 
signed on October 7, 1944 by delegates from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and 
Transjordan.20 "The Saudi and Yemeni representatives referred the 
protocol to their governments,"21 and observers from other Arab countries 
expressed their hope for eventual affiliation. *20
■*̂ Foda Ezzeldin, The Projected' Arab Court of Justice (The Hague, 
Holland: Martinius Nijhoff, 1957), p. 6-7.
20See Appendix A.
^Al-Ahram (Cairo), October 8, 1944, p. 1.
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During February and March 1945, a committee of Arab foreign 
ministers and experts met in Cairo to draft the constitution of the 
League of Arab States. On March 7 a General Arab Congress convened in 
Cairo to review and draft a pact known as the "Alexandria Protocol,"22 
which was signed March 22, by six of the seven founding members, Egypt, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan. A copy of the pact 
was sent to the Imam of Yemen, who signed it on May 10, and the pact, the
O  OCovenant of the League of Arab States, came into effect on May 11.
The Pact of the League of Arab States (now generally called simply 
the Arab League) provided for a permanent seat in Cairo, including a 
Council and a permanent secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, a 
political committee, and various functional committees. It also stip­
ulated that the objective of the Arab League was close cooperation between 
member states in matters concerning economic and financial affairs, 
communications, cultural affairs, problems of nationality, social affairs 
and health. Membership is restricted to independent Arab States who 
wish to join, and are willing to assume an obligation to support the 
League financially on a prorated basis to be determined from time to time 
by the League’s Council.
22gee Appendix B.
^Ratifications were as follows:
Transjordan March 31, 1945
Iraq April 1, 1945
Syria April 3, 1945
Egypt April 15, 1945
Lebanon April 7, 1945
Saudi Arabia April 7, 1945
Yemen May 11, 1945
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The Arab League Council composed of all members of the organization, 
is made up of representatives from the member states (each having one 
vote regardless of the number of representatives it sends to the Council) 
and a representative from Palestine, meeting twice a year (now in March 
and September) in regular sessions at Cairo. Sessions may be held else­
where at the option of the Council.
The principal function of the council is to supervise the execution 
of agreements concluded between the League members, to mediate disputes 
between members or between members and non-members, and to coordinate 
defense measures in the event of an attack or threat of aggression against 
members. Also it has internal legislative functions including the 
preparation and approval of administrative regulations for the Council, 
the technical committees and the secretariat, and regulations of certain 
matters including the approval of the budget. The appointment of the 
Secretary-General, confirmation of the Secretary-General and approval 
of amendments to the Pact require a two-thirds majority, other admin­
istrative actions require only a simple majority.
The League's Council is the legal decision making body which 
ratifies decisions recommended by the political committee. Voting 
procedures for the Council are established by the League's Pact and are 
enumerated for various situations. Members of the Council have no direct 
veto power; a member can refuse to implement decisions approved by the 
membership, but cannot block an action. ^  The chairmanship of the Council 
is rotated among the member states in alphabetical order.
^See Appendix B, Articles 4 and 6.
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The Arab League Secretariat, given only administrative and executive 
functions by the Pact, assumed an important role in the decision making 
process from the beginning. It is headed by a Secretary-General in the 
rank of ambassador, elected for a five year term whose office includes 
four supervisors (Mushrifin), experts in the fields of cultural affairs, 
economics, public health, and social affairs. The new secretariat 
building in Cairo was dedicated on March 22, 1960, the fifteenth anniver­
sary of the Arab League.
CHAPTER II
ARAB MONARCHS AND PRESIDENTS
The destruction of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies in World War I 
resulted in British and French control over the Arab world, creating some
Arab kingdoms and dependent states ruled by allies to the west; since
I
then rivalries, disputes, hatred, and mistrust have existed in the Arab 
world.
At the beginning of World War I, Britain had promised the creation 
of an independent Arab Kingdom in southwest Asia in return for Arab help 
against Turkey. It offered its plan to Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, who turned 
it down as he was building a kingdom of his own. Then, the plan was 
offered to the Hashemite Hussein Ben Ali, the Sherif of Mecca, who 
accepted it and raised the banner of the Arab Revolt against the Turks 
in 1915, believing in, and dreaming of, his expected postwar kingdom 
which would be ruled by his sons and would include all of Mesapotamia, 
part of what is now Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.
As World War I ended, with the Allies victorious, Ibn Saud feared 
the creation of the projected Hashemite Kingdom, and in 1924, the Saudi 
armies attacked the Hashemites at Zuraba in Hijaz, pushing forward to 
the frontiers of Jordan, destroying the Hashemites power and expelling 
them from Arabia. Since that time, dynastic rivalries have existed 
between the Hashemites of Jordan and Iraq and the house of Saud.
13
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When in 1944 and 1945, the League of Arab States was being orga­
nized, Ibn Saud refused to sign the League's Pact as his attitude towards 
Arab "unity and brotherhood" took a different turn. His fear of a strong 
Hashemite bloc within the League, his apprehension of interference in 
Saudi Arabia's affairs, and reluctance to share the oil revenues with any­
one else made him extremely cold to close unity among the seven now 
independent Arab countries. Finally, Ibn Saud consented to sign the 
League pact only after the introduction of an amendment to the text which 
emphasized the "Independence and Sovereignty" of the member states and 
the addition of a provision which stated that "every member state . . . 
shall respect the form of government obtaining in other states . . . and 
recognize (it) as one of the rights of those states . . . and pledge 
itself not to take any action tending to change that form."-*-
Since the establishment of the League in 1945, Arab leaders car­
ried their interests and traditional rivalries into the League. The 
conflict between the interests of the Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan and 
Iraq on one side, and the Egyptian-Saudi interests on the other developed 
a balance of power system within the League, and led to the formation of 
blocs within the system, dominating the League's affairs.
The creation of the state of Israel in Arab Palestine in 1948 
resulted in sharp differences of opinion among the Arab governments and 
nationalists, between those who saw Western imperialism as a major threat 
to Arab independence, and those who believed that friendship and coopera­
tion with the West would bring a satisfactory solution to the Palestine 
problem.
•*-See Appendix B, Articles 2 and 8.
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After the rise of President Nasser of Egypt in s: 1950's, Arab 
leaders virtually split into two streams as far as Are: Nationalism and 
Arab hostility to Israel were concerned. "Those who favored cooperation 
with the West against Russia in the belief that this would bring some 
Western cooperation over Israel"^ were led by Iraq's Prime Minister, Nuri 
Al-Said, followed by the reactionary rulers of Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia, and those revolutionaries who opposed 
the West were led by Egypt and Syria.
In 1953 the United States had decided on military aid to Iraq, and 
an exchange of notes on April 21, 1954 concerning the formulation of a 
regional defense alliance and the Baghdad Pact was made. It was under­
stood between the two governments that Iraq would play its part in 
regional defense.
This action by Iraq raised the whole question of relations with the 
other Arab States and the possible breaking of the solidarity of the Arab 
League. The Arabs themselves had tried to meet the problems of regional 
defense by ratifying the Arab Collective Security Pact, known as the Arab 
Joint Defense Council, which came into force on April 13, 1952, under 
which the members pledged to consult in times of danger, to coordinate 
their armed forces and resources, and to aid without delay any member 
subjected to aggression.3
In August 1954 Nasser had sent Major Salah Salem to dissuade 
Nuri and Iraqi leaders from acting independently of the League. The
^Charles D. Home, The Arabs and Israel (London: The Bodley Head 
Ltd., 1970), p. 67.
^Mathew A. Fitzsimons, Empire by Treaty (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 124.
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following month, "Nuri went to Cairo and vainly sought to persuade Nasser 
of the desirability of broadening the Arab League Collective Security Pact 
by including Pakistan, Turkey, Britain, and the United States.'"^
At Cairo in December 1954, a meeting of the foreign ministers of 
the member states of the Arab League Collective Security Council made 
an effort to settle differences and agreed on the necessity of strengthen­
ing the Pact and developing a military organization to assume responsi­
bility for the Arab Middle Eastern defense. But, in casting their votes 
for Arab unity of defense, Egypt and Iraq were working from separate 
corners. Accordingly, on February 24, 1955, the regional pact was signed 
at Baghdad, Turkey and Iraq pledged cooperation.
The signing of the Baghdad Pact by Iraq led to a violent outburst 
from Egypt, which accused Iraq of having betrayed the quest for Arab unity, 
and "in rispote Egypt sought compensatory stronger ties with Syria and 
Saudi Arabia, and for a time with J o r d a n . T o  Nasser and his followers, 
the "Baghdad Pact disrupted the common front of the Arab League against 
Israel.Because of Arab Nationalist opposition to the Pact, it 
contributed largely to the destruction of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
"It disrupted the Arab League, and pushed the Arab Nationalists into work­
ing arrangements with Russia which brought Communist influence into the 
Arab world; the one thing the Pact was meant to prevent.
^See Appendix C,
5Zeev Sharef, Three Days (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Inc., 
1962), p. 72.
^George A. Lanyi, Crisis and Continuity in World Politics (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1966), p. 624.
Ĝ. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and 
Faber Ltd., 1966), p. 137.
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The Baghdad Pact broke the solidarity of the Arab League, and it 
seemed that Egypt would break up the League by insisting on Iraq's expul­
sion or by withdrawing itself. But, the League survived because neither 
rival wished to take the responsibility for its breakup.
Although the rulers of the Arab republics, kingdoms and sheikhdoms 
have reasons for maintaining ties with Eastern and Western powers, most 
agree on the dangers of involvement with the great powers, and the neces­
sity of maintaining Arab solidarity against their interference.
The 1956 British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt evoked resent­
ment throughout the Arab world. It was felt among the Arabs that the 
attack was directed not against Egypt alone but against all Arabs, and 
specifically against Arab nationalism. Consequently, the conservative 
Arab leaders stood firmly behind Egypt in its resistance to the attack 
because any show of open alignment with the West would have made their own 
domestic power and authority less stable. Lebanon was an exception; it 
failed to give any active support to Egypt and, the government refused to 
sever diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France.
After the Suez War, of 1956, the Arab revolutionaries saw Western 
imperialism as the major threat to their independence, they felt that they 
ought to rid themselves of any Western influence or control. As the revo­
lution spread, however, a growing mutuality of interests tended to draw 
the revolutionary governments into one bloc, and drive the foes of the 
revolution into another, thus, the fear of revolution dictated most of 
the decisions and actions of the Arab rulers.
The birth of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria on 
February 21, 1958, called for an Arab unity throughout the Arab world,
18
and led to the merger of Iraq and Jordan into the short lived Arab Federa­
tion, which was destroyed by the overthrow of the Iraqi pro-western 
government. Subsequently, "the Arab States fell into a number of dif­
ferent and conflicting alignments, although all still proclaimed loyalty 
to the Arab League and its Collective Security Pact of 1950.
Since the establishment of the United Arab Republic in 1958, 
several attempts for unity were proclaimed. But, the growing potential 
for conflicts among national and ideological interests, and among the rich 
states and poor states, hindered the course of unity, and made the Arab 
world a breeding place of subversion, assassination, and local wars.
In January 1958, King Saud tried to prevent the Egyptian-Syrian merger, 
and his attempt not only failed, but also resulted in a political crisis 
that almost cost him his throne. And with the coming of Faisal to power, 
Saudi Arabian policy reverted to the basic lines drawn by former King 
Ibn Saud, "cautious friendship with Egypt and other Arab states, little 
involvement in Arab affairs, and correct relations with the Western 
powers.
In the autumn of 1961, after the secession of Syria from the United 
Arab Republic, President Nasser of Egypt had decided to build his policy 
on the foundation of revolutionary ideology so as to stimulate the Arab 
world towards Arab unity, and also, to create internal pressure on his 
rivals. And for that purpose he saw in the Yemeni revolution of 1962 a *9
^John c. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York: Harper 
Brothers Co., 1958), p. 207.
9Hisham B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East 
in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
1962), p. 241.
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golden opportunity. His array intervened as the champion of the revolu­
tionary progress, while "Saudi Arabia and Jordan felt compelled to support 
the royalists out of dynastic solidarity, and were looked upon by their 
people as ultra-reactionary. "-*-̂
In February 1963, Morocco's king, fearing the power and influence 
of Nasser, tried to create a federation or league of the Maghreb (North­
west Africa) States to offset the Egyptian influence in the Arab world, 
and called for a conference at Casablanca. Ben Bella of Algeria scorned 
such scheme calling it a "Casablanca Bloc," and argued that it "would be 
a tool in the hands of Western imperialists against Arab unity; common 
aims and needs," he said, "must be the only criteria of inter-Arab 
relations. "■*-■*•
At the end of 1963, the Arab States were on unsatisfactory terms 
with each other. Syria was feuding with Egypt, and after November, 1963 
with Iraq. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were engaged in a struggle for the 
future of Yemen, where 40,000 Egyptian troops had failed to win a final 
victory for the revolution there, Algeria had come to clashes with 
Morocco over a border dispute and had another dispute with Tunisia.
Tunisia and Morocco severed terms after Tunisia recognized the indepen­
dence of Mauritania which was acquired by Morocco. Egypt was hostile 
to Jordan as well as Saudi Arabia, and took the side of revolutionary 
Algeria against her conservative neighbors Morocco and Tunisia. Syria 1
^Nutting, The Arabs: A Narrative History, p. 217.
11A 1-Ahram (Cairo), February 23, 1953, p. 1.
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was unfriendly to Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon. "Of the thirteen member 
states of the Arab League, only three were on satisfactory terms with 
everyone: Kuwait, the Sudan, and Libya."12
In spite of their hatred and distrust of each other and exchanges 
of insults through the press, the Kings and Presidents of the Arab states 
often gathered for a summit meeting of the Arab League, kissing, embrac­
ing, and shaking hands in an atmosphere of brotherhood, re-establishing 
friendship and settling all differences within few hours in the spirit of 
the Arab League for the sake of Palestine and Arab unity. In 1963, 
when the Israeli Chief of Staff declared that Israel would divert the waters 
of the Jordan River against the will of the Arabs, Nasser asked for a 
meeting of the Arab Kings and Heads of States to take place as soon as 
possible, regardless of the strifes and conflicts between them. "Those 
with whom we are in strife, we are prepared to meet, those with whom 
we have a quarrel, we are ready for the sake of Palestine, to sit with."-^
On December 17, 1964, the Cairo weekly magazine, Rose Al-Yusuf published
an article containing two principal points concerning the Jordan River
diversion. The first was that "the United Arab Republic will not let
itself be pushed into a battle with Israel before the attainment of
unity among all the Arab countries." The second point which seemed to 
contradict the first, was that "the UAR know how and when it will eli­
minate Israel, and it knows itself to be capable of shouldering this
^ Al-Usbua Al-Arabi [The Arab Week] (Beirut), February 18, 1964,
p. 37.
^carnal Abdel Nasser, Khitabat Carnal Abdel Nasser [Gamal Abdel 
Nasser Speeches] (Cairo: National Press House, 1972), p. 651.
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burden by itself. It seemed that on certain goals the Arab leaders
were largely united, but, their individualistic nature reflected the 
means by which their goals might be attained.
At the beginning of 1967 one of the issues that divided the Arab 
world was the Civil War in Yemen. Egypt had sent an army there to defend 
the Yemen's republic against royalists, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian 
attacks. King Hussein and King Faisal believed that without Egyptian 
military help the revolutionary regime at San'a would quickly collapse. 
Because of that, by March 1967, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were boycotting 
the meetings of the Arab League's Defense Council, and "demands [by 
Egypt and Syria] had been raised for their expulsion from the League mem­
bership."-*^ Many members of the League, including Libya, Sudan,
Lebanon, Kuwait, and to an extent Iraq, were clearly distressed at the 
sharp ideological cleavage [concerning the Yemen War] between Egypt,
Syria, Yemen, and Jordan-Saudi Arabia alliances, believing that the 
cleavage could only cause them harm. They preferred to maintain good 
relations with everyone, and disliked being pressed to take sides.
Despite their disputes and political differences, there are certain 
great issues which automatically bind the Arabs together: "Their mutual 
interest in freedom from great-power interference; their common experience 
in winning independence, and shared fears of attempts to abrogate it; the 
Sacred cause of Arab lands not yet free of foreign rule."Ik The Arabs
l^Rose Al-Yusuf (Cairo), December 17, 1964, p. 28.
■^Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1967 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), p. 167.
^Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and The World (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), p. 12.
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manifested such bonds during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, as all the 
Arab States went to the aid of Egypt, Jordan and Syria; and for the first 
time the Arabs used their oil as a weapon against the West. Iraq and 
Kuwait stopped oil deliveries to the West, but Saudi Arabia and Libya 
refused to do likewise. Again the Arabs manifested such bonds in the 
Arab-Israeli War in October, 1973, as all were solidly united behind an 
oil embargo.
One of the most important features of the Arab-Israeli October War 
of 1973 was the new pattern of Arab solidarity manifested. Iraq sent very 
substantial forces to the front, as it did in 1967, only this time they 
took an active part in the fighting. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia contributed 
vast amounts to the War chest while Libya contributed money as well as 
Mirage fighter planes acquired from France. In addition, the three 
Maghreb countries contributed small contingents.
Saudi Arabia took the lead in putting the Arab "oil weapon" into 
play, by placing a total embargo on oil shipments to the United States, 
Holland, and Britain for their sympathy and collaboration over Israel.
The other oil producers followed its lead. Countries like Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Iraq could feel completely safe from any Israeli threat. 
Whatever contribution they made to the Arab cause against Israel was 
made purely on the grounds of Pan-Arab considerations.
CHAPTER III
ARAB UNITY AND DISUNITY
The move towards an Arab unity was inspired by the national feeling 
which had been subdued in the Arab world through centuries of foreign 
domination and divisive influence.
Since the creation of the state of Israel in Arab Palestine in 1948, 
the idea of such unity has had a powerful hold on imaginations of the 
Arab people, and "no Arab leader is strong enough to ignore its appeal."1 
Each leader justifies himself in terms of his devotion to this ideal, and 
accuses his opponents of its betrayal. Many academic and diplomatic ob­
servers have noted that "the presence of Israel in the Middle East 
has contributed largely to the movement of Arab unity.",2 and that the 
unity of all Arabs and the restoration of Palestine has become the goal 
as well as the dream of the Arab nation and Arab nationalists.
The leaders of Arab nationalism were also the leaders of the Arab 
revolution, and their drive for Arab unity demanded an end to all Arab 
dependence on and relief from foreign control. And thus, the division 
of the Arab world into two camps developed. Those aligned with the West 
opposed both Arab nationalism and the revolution, and the revolutionaries 
who carried on the struggle to mobilize the popular masses in order to
^Siegman, Arab Unity and Disunity, p. 81.
^Jacob C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension 
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 377.
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effect radical transformation of the Arab society. As the revolution 
spread, the Arab world became engulfed in different disputes and border 
clashes, creating a divergence between nationalism and national interests, 
and hindering the achievement of Arab unity and the restoration of 
Palestine.
Arab defeat in Palestine and in the Suez War of 1956, strengthened 
the belief among Arab nationalists that unity would provide the strength 
they needed to liberate the Arab world and to put an end to the 
Palestine problem. To accomplish it they engaged in a series of military 
revolutions and in several attempts for unity, such as the merger on 
February 21, 1958 of Egypt and Syria into the UAR joined later by Yemen, 
and also the creation of the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan formed on 
March 19, 1958. But both attempts failed because of the clash between 
nationalism and national interests. Syria justified its secession with 
the argument that it wasn't ready to accept Nasser's Arab Socialism, and 
naturally King Hussein had no wish to be united with a revolutionary 
Iraqi regime which destroyed his federation and endangered his throne.
The secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic dramatized 
the basic ideological differences between Syria and Egypt, and it led to 
a new Arab power struggle in the Arab world. Although Nasser emphasized 
the "demand for a single nationalist front in each country representing 
all views as a prerequisite for unity,"3 Nasser's demands were impossible 
to achieve in the Arab world, as the Arabs first had to overcome the 
social and economic backwardness which plagued the Arab countries.
^Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin (New York: The 
Devin Adair Co., 1965), p. 260.
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Also, it seemed unlikely that Egypt would consider federation with a 
state which had not embarked on a social and economic revolution similar 
to that taking place in Egypt.
In 1961, President Abdel-Karim Kassem of Iraq claimed sovereignty 
over the oil-rich Sheikhdom of Kuwait. However, Kuwait was under 
British control and Britain did not propose to give it up. Various Arab 
rivalries came into play, too. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt wanted to 
see Iraq in Kuwait, and consequently they were determined to block the 
Iraqi ambitions by sending their troops (under the Arab League command) 
for the defense of Kuwait. To Arab nationalists, this action by Iraq, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia "dramatized that the major obstacle to Arab unity 
was no longer foreign influence but, disagreement among the Arabs them­
selves .
As the military capabilities of Israel multiplied after the Arab- 
Israeli War of 1967, and as Israel demonstrated such great capacity to 
hurt the Arabs in the previous Arab-Israeli wars, several Arab states 
felt the danger of such power directly and again they preached for Arab 
unity.
On November 8, 1970, the rulers of Sudan, Egypt, and Libya 
announced a plan for an Arab Socialist Federation of their states which 
would permit a unified action on essential Arab problems within a 
revolutionary framework, while leaving each state free to handle internal 
issues on its own terms5--Syria asked to join. But, on April 17, 1971,
^Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle 
East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 
p. 372.
^Al-Ahram (Cairo), November 9, 1970, p. 1.
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the Sudanese government announced that it would not enter the proposed 
federation. Internal opposition led by the Communist Party had forced 
President General Jaafar Al-Numeiry and his ministers to reconsider 
their decision. And in June 1971 Sudan withdrew but promised active 
collaboration in the federation program.
On August 2, 1973, an attempt was made by Libya's Muammar Quaddaffi 
for a merger with Egypt. But, on September 1, 1973, Egypt's Arab 
Socialist Union Party declined to approve such a merger because of 
Egyptian opposition to Quaddaffi's Islamic ideologies. In January 
1974, another attempt was made by Quaddaffi to merge Libya and Tunisia in 
an Arab Federation; again, Quaddaffi's attempt failed to gain the approval 
of the Tunisian people. It is clear that there are still many obstacles 
lying in the path of Ai'ab unity; localism and nationalism, social and 
economic backwardness, all hinder progress towards the ideal of Arab 
unity, and because of that, the prospects of Fertile Crescent union have 
been dim. Also, they account for the failure of union between Egypt and 
Syria, and made the rest of the Arab states unready to accept the 
uncertainties of union with each other.
Despite the failure of the many attempts at Arab unity "no Arab 
leader, public figure, or private citizen who wishes to retain his stand­
ing and influence with other Arabs would criticize the ideal of Arab 
unity or suggest that it will not eventually, in some form or another, 
come to p a s s . M o s t  opponents of Arab union do not oppose unity, but 
they argue that a complete merger in one superstate is of no advantage to
^Cremeans, The Arabs and The World, p. 58.
27
the ordinary Arab. Furthermore, when a plan for unity posed the question 
of where power ultimate should reside, the countries could not easily 
agree.
On March 14, 1963, in an address to the Syrian and Iraqi delegation 
in Cairo, President Nasser criticized the Arab leaders for their insincere 
efforts toward Arab unity; "we are," he told them, "really suffering 
from a complex about union because of too much talk."^ And in a 1964 
interview with the Observer, Nasser said significantly that "the real 
meaning of Arab unity is unity of action in the face of danger; Arabs 
must work together. Constitutional unity is different and will be 
difficult to achieve.
After President Nasser's death, most Arab intellectuals and regimes 
preferred to work out their own ideology by "mixing nationalism with 
socialism, each in its own way."^ Egypt's President Sadat, himself, 
called for a new society to be built on "science and faith."
In December 1972, Quaddaffi of Libya maintained in a public rally 
that "only Arab unity could give the power, the strength, and the means 
to the Arabs to defeat Isi'ael and imperialism." A few days later 
President Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia replied that "unity of two under­
developed states cannot lead to strength.
Âl-Ahram (Cairo), March 15, 1963, p. 3.
^The Observer (London), July 5, 1964, p. 5.
^Arnold Ilottinger, "The Depth of Arab Radicalism," Foreign 
Affairs, LI (April 1973), p. 493.
1°A1-Usbua Al-Arabi [The Arab Week] (Beirut), December 17, 1972,
p. 3.
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Finally, it should be noted that the various Arab states have 
attained their independence at different dates; they have had varying 
experiences and possess different traditions; they are ruled by a 
miscellany of systems that no two Arab states have precisely the same 
form of government, and they are illinformed about each other because 
of the rulers control and suppression. Besides these, the continuation 
of political and internal instability, the continuation of tension between 
the Arab states because of power struggle and because of the presence of 
foreign influence among the Arab leaders, social and economic backward­
ness, localism and national interests, and the unfair distribution of 
wealth which have developed a heightened individualism rather than a 
consciousness of moving towards unity, all of these would seem to 
indicate that Arab unity is still far from realization. The Arab states 
are. in a number of different stages of social and economic developments, 
and since the goals and ambitions of the individual Arab rulers are 
still at odds, no king or president is ready to submerge his state's 
interests or his own personal power in the common purpose of an Arab 
nation. It is likely that things will stay much as they are right now, 
but, both the reactionary forces and the forces driving in the direction 
of unity will continue powerful for a while.
Regardless of the motivations of the Arab states towards unity, 
the prospects for realization of complete political, economic, social and 
cultural unity are still remote. Only time, education and enlightened 
leadership can bring to fruition the movement for Arab unity; perhaps a 
union on a federal basis is the most sensible way for the Arabs to 
realize their goal of unity, as this would give an economic boost which 
would stimulate the industrial growth, and at the same time it would
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permit the component parts of the Arab world to move at their own pace in 
their own way. Perhaps a regional merger will take place; such as a 
federation of North Africa, another of the Nile Valley, and another of 
the Middle East. But, whatever happens, the forces for union will 
remain, and so will the forces for disunion. History will show whether 
the Arabs will in time reach their goals. "... The way to Arab unity 
through the Arab people.
•^Nasser1s speech before a committee of the National Union 
General Congress, in Cairo on July 14, 1960. Al-Ahram (Cairo), 
July 15, 1960, p. 3.
CHAPTER IV
THE ARAB LEAGUE: FAILURE AND SUCCESS
Since its establishment in 1945, the Arab League Objectives were 
and still are: The Arabization of Palestine, and the close cooperation 
between member states in matters concerning unity of economic and 
financial affairs, communications, cultural affairs, problems of 
nationality, social affairs and health.
The Palestine problem was the first and still the most important 
issue to confront the League since its formation. In 1945, the Arab 
governments unanimously agreed that "the Arabism of Palestine is a vital 
element of the Pan-Arabism."1 Just before the partition of Palestine was 
resolved, "Amir Abdullah of Transjordan had indicated to Mrs. Golda 
Meyerson of the Jewish Agency that in case of partition, he wanted to 
annex the area of Palestine awarded to the Arabs."2 Soon after Abdullah's 
plans were revealed, the League, at a meeting at Aley in Lebanon, July 28, 
1947, resolved to have its members invade Palestine if the United Nations 
approved a proposal to partition Palestine. The League called upon its 
members to "send their armies to Palestine to forstall Zionism and at the
•kiirdhari L. Tikku, Islam and its Cultural Divergence (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 27.
^Sharef, Three Days, p. 72.
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same time to refrain from claiming territory.occupied by their forces. 
Fearful that Egyptian-Saudi forces might enter Palestine and perhaps 
endanger his Emirate, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, on November 11, 1947, 
proposed to the League that they should finance a Transjordanian conquest 
of Palestine, which he was ready to undertake because "Transjordan was 
not a member of the UN and could, therefore, defy with impunity the 
partition scheme."^ The proposal was rejected for obvious reasons, and 
Egypt and the others decided to put their trust in the Palestinian Arabs, 
organized and directed by Hajj Amin Al-Husaini and in the so called Army 
of Deliverance to be recruited and financed by them.
After the termination of the British mandate in Palestine in 1948, 
the State of Israel was proclaimed and created on May 14, 1948, despite 
the attacks from the armies of the neighboring Arab States, "This defeat 
not only brought the Arab League into dispute because of League's failure 
to produce any kind of military coordination between its members, it also 
created a deep-seated bitterness against the Arab governments among the 
younger generation of Arabs.
The failure of the Arab League in Palestine could be attributed to 
the League's weakness and its general ineffectiveness. Because it has 
effects on the policies of its members only on key issues, it also failed 
to establish the entity of "Arab Palestine" because of the "differences
^John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate (London: The Cresset Press,
1959), p. 243.
^Hazza Al-Majali, Muthukkarati [My Memoirs] (Amman: Istilclal Press, 
1963), p. 385.
-’Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, p. 80.
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between King Farouk and Abdullah"^ who disregarded the League, and also 
because of the distrust and lack of cooperation among the several armies.
Palestine was given a special treatment in the League's Pact through 
reserving a seat on the Arab League Council for a Palestine representative, 
and also by the League's efforts to coordinate military action during 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949, as the League called and urged the 
Arab Countries to form an Arab Army of Deliverance. [The Arab armies 
entered the Palestine War in 1948, not under the unified flag of Arab 
nationalism, but torn by internal feuds, jealousies and rancor. There 
were seven Arab armies fighting in Palestine under 6 or 7 different and 
separate commands.] But, in spite of that, for many Palestinians, the 
League had betrayed them and betrayed Palestine! It failed to stop 
Jordan from annexing the west bank, and it failed to create a Palestinian 
state in Gaza Strip, a state that would represent the Palestinians at the 
UN and to the rest of the world.
After the defeat in Palestine, the League failed to coordinate the 
Arabs in the struggle against Israel. Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia and 
King Hassan II of Morocco refused to join a front against Israel, "as 
Bourgiba was attempting to recognize the Zionist State of Israel.
Tunisia's voice at the Arab League was and still is regarded as a Western 
voice rather than that of an Arab, and this widened the gulf between 
Tunisia and most of the Arab States.
^William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 205.
N̂ewsweek (New York), May 10, 1965, p. 50.
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The League's failure in Palestine and its failure to coordinate the 
Arabs in the struggle against Israel, left an impression among the Arab 
Nationalists that the Arab League would never come to serve as the 
primary medium for inter-Arab relations or as the foundation for Arab 
solidarity. The radical Pan-Arabists had long complained that the League 
was more of an obstacle to Arab unity than an aid to it, because it 
sanctified the separate sovereignties of its members, and by forbidding 
them to interfere in each other's internal affairs hampered the spirit 
of the revolution in the Arab society, which was the only solid basis
on which eventual unity could be built. While these quarrels raged, the
League was naturally powerless and lost its effectiveness because of the 
lack of a general desire for cooperation among the member states.
In 1955 the League had been paralyzed by the struggle between
Egypt and Iraq over the Baghdad Pact, and in 1958 by the landing of the 
American Marines in Lebanon and the return of the British troops to 
Jordan, and in 1960 by the vicious propaganda between the UAR and Jordan 
after the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister, Hazza Al-Majali; 
at the same time an ideological quarrel was going on between Nasser of 
Egypt and Kassem of Iraq, and by 1962 first Iraq and then Egypt were 
boycotting the sessions of the League during the dispute over Kuwait.
Also there was a split between the League members over the issue of the 
Yemeni Revolution of 1962, and the intervention of Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan in that war.
Although they carried out their vicious propaganda against each 
other through a media campaign, Arab leaders carried out such propaganda
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to the League’s meetings ignoring and hindering the objectives of the 
League. On August 17, 1962 at a meeting of the League council at the 
Lebanese town of Shtura, Syria and-Egypt confronted each other by filing 
complaints and accusations. The Syrian delegates distributed copies of 
a "Black Book" that presented a detailed list of sins committed by the 
Egyptian authorities during the union of the two countries. The UAR in 
turn accused the Syrian government of conducting a torture campaign 
against nationalist elements in Syria, and of serving the purpose of 
imperialism. Mr. Dayri, the Egyptian representative, protested the Syrian 
accusations and condemned the League: "The Arab League," he said, "has 
become a humiliation to its member states, it can do nothing for the 
aspirations of the Arab struggle.Mr.  Abdel-Khaliq Hassouna, the 
Egyptian Secretary-General of the Arab League, broke down in tears! This 
brought the Arab League to a point of collapse, as the UAR of Egypt had 
withdrawn, and the Egyptian government ignored the League for over a 
year. The Iraqi government, which was still demanding the annexation of 
Kuwait, had not attended the Shtura meeting.
By the middle of 1963, the Arab world was at the climax of Arab 
quarrels, with revoluntionary powers pitted against conservatives or 
moderate regimes: Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, the Republic of Yemen, and Syria, 
variously, against the others. But, the most bitter disputes were the 
rival revolutionary movements of Syria and Egypt, who were boycotting the 
League because of the presence of their rivals at the League’s meetings.
^An-Nahar (Beirut), August 23, 1962, p. 3.
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Also Morocco was boycotting the League after the border incident with 
Algeria in November 1963.
Because of rivalries, distrust, and disputes, the Arab leaders 
dominated the League with their separate and national interests; and in 
order to achieve their particularistic goals and objectives, they formed 
bloc patterns within the League, which narrowed the League's range of 
action because particularistic goals and objectives conflict with a 
collective action, and this " . . .  seemed greater by contrast with the 
ideals which the League was intended to achieve.
Besides its failure in Palestine, the Arab League failed to bring 
unity to the Arab world. In 1951, Nazim Al-Kudsi, Prime Minister of 
Syria, proposed an immediate Arab union by the Arab League. His plan 
was submitted to the League Council on January 23, 1951 for study and 
comment, but it was shelved at the request of the Council members. In 
January 1954, Iraq's Prime Minister, Fadhil Al-Jamali, proposed a plan 
for the unification of Arab ministries of foreign affairs, education, war, 
finance, and economics under the supervision of the Arab League, when 
his plan reached the League Council it was rejected by most of the members, 
and on March 22, 1960 at the dedication of the League's new Secretariat 
Building in Cairo, when Hassouna, the Secretary-General, called for 
complete Arab union; "Lebanon immediately rejected the idea; and one 
member of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies urged that the Lebanese
^T. R. Russel, "The Arab League: A Reassessment," Middle East 
Journal, X (Spring, 1956).
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government demand the resignation of Hassouna and withdraw from the Arab 
League."10
The League's failure to bring unity to the Arab world could be 
attributed to the unwillingness of and lack of cooperation among its 
members, and to the founders of the League as they "made a definite, if 
reluctant, decision against Arab unity and in favor of regional organi­
zation. n11
After the loss of Palestine to the Zionists in 1948, the Arab League 
bent its efforts toward helping the Arab states to achieve their independ­
ence from Britain and France. It carried out their aspiration for 
independence; it supported them financially, acted on their behalf to the 
imperialistic powers, "Britain and France," advocated their cause at the 
United Nations and carried it to the world capitals, it requested NATO 
powers in 1959 not to support France in her military campaign in Algeria, 
and on September 26, 1959 the League proclaimed the creation of the 
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic," which in fact was a 
"government in exile." Sudan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, and 
Algeria owed their independence to the Arab League.
Besides helping the Arab states to achieve their independence, the 
League concentrated on the problem of security and in coordinating actions 
against external threats involving its members; it launched the boycott 
against Israel in 1950, it took the Palestine issue to the members of
•*-0Al-Gomhouriya (Cairo), March 25, 1960, p. 5.
■^Macdonald, The League of Arab States, p. 53.
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Afro-Asian blocs and urged them to boycott Israel since the Bandung 
conference of 1955, it supported Egypt's policy of nationalizing of the 
Suez Canal, July 26, 1956, and of denying Israel the use of the canal. It 
stood firmly behind Egypt during the Suez War when France, Britain, and 
Israel invaded Egypt on October 30, 1956, during the Lebanese crisis in 
1958, and after the landing of the American Marines in Lebanon at the 
request of Chamouns government, the Arab League with the assistance of 
the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold was successful in resolving the 
crisis and urging the immediate withdrawal of the American Marines, and 
in 1961, the League succeeded in settling the Iraqi dispute over Kuwait.
When in December 1963 Israel announced its plan for the diversion 
of the Jordan River, the League emphasized its seriousness and "called 
for a Joint Arab Military Command"-^ which came into effect on January 17, 
1964. And on May 24, 1964, "the League established under the Palestine 
Arab Leadership the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)"-^ which 
comes under the League's autopsy.
By May 27, 1967, the League had unanimously "declared the solidarity 
of the Arab world .with the United Arab Republic"^ against the expected 
Israeli attack. After the Arab defeat in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, 
the League at the November 1967 Arab conference in Khartoum presented the 
real Arab terms concerning Israel: "No recognition of Israel, no peace
■^Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin, p. 262.
■^Jacob C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 360.
■̂ Pollc, The United States and the Arab World, p. 297.
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with Israel, and no freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, as long as 
Israel ignores the return of the Palestinians to P a l e s t i n e . A n d  
recently during the last Arab-Israeli October War of 1973, the League 
stood as firm as ever in solidarity with Egypt and Syria, urging all the 
Arab countries to do all they could to liberate the occupied Arab land.
The League lent its support to the oil embargo which has been used against 
the United States and against countries who are in sympathy with Israel.
Despite its failure in Palestine, in the achievement of Arab unity, 
in settling some of Arab disputes, and in coordinating actions against 
external threats involving its member states, despite that, the League 
was successful and played an important role in promoting cooperation 
[promoting cooperation in all spheres among the Arab states is one of the 
main objectives of the Arab League since its formation in 1945] among the 
Arab states. An economic council was established under the Joint Defense 
and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950, to coordinate and unify the 
economic policies, commerce, trade, and financial developments of the 
Arab states. Also in 1950, the boycott against Israel was launched 
imposing economic sanctions upon and through those states with which 
Israel did business and upon whose support Israel relied for her contin­
uing existence. The boycott aimed at the withholding of business by all 
Arab states from those Western firms that might establish factories, 
branches, and agencies in Israel, extend credit to the Israeli government 
and its agencies, license patents for Israeli use or take part in other
^ Al-Hayat (Beirut), November 28, 1967, p. 1.
39
activities calculated to advance the interests of the Zionist state.
The boycott was not uniformly successful because not all Arab 
governments applied it with equal enthusiasm. Some, such as Jordan, 
under Western political pressure, deliberately evaded it. Thus King 
Abdullah made a secret deal in 1950 to permit the Israelis to move their 
commerce through his territory. Most of the history of the boycott was 
less spectacular. Its enforcement hit hardest at the British and 
Americans. A British insurance firm with heavy interests in the Arab 
world forced a Zionist Jew to resign from its board of directors in order 
to protect its Arab business. The Coca-Cola Company granted a franchise 
to a bottler in Israel, and most Arab countries, led by Egypt, barred 
Coca-Cola from their territories; also, Ford-made cars were banned from 
the Arab countries because Ford had an assembly line in Israel. The 
biggest Japanese industrial firms —  Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Toyotoa, and 
Honda among them —  refused to sell to or buy from Israel. "During Expo 
'70, at Osaka, Japan, the Israeli Airline, El-Al, was not given landing 
rights.
Regional economic integration, nevertheless, has been a constant 
concern of the League, and some progress has been made despite apparently 
overwhelming political obstacles. Two formal economic treaties, the 
Convention for Facilitating Trade Exchange and the Regulation of Transit 
Trade Between the Arab League, were signed in March 1953.
In 1954, the Arab Postal Union was founded' by the League to 
establish more strict postal relations between the Arab countries than
"^Fisher, Storm Over the Arab World, p. 308.
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those laid down by the Universal Postal Union, to pursue the development 
and modernization of postal services in member countries.
In June 1957, the Arab Development Bank was established, and "the 
bank was formally inaugurated in January 1959 starting with a capital of 
20 million Egyptian p o u n d s . T h e  Bank proposed projects for joint 
Arab commercial ventures including the Arab Tanker Company, the Arab 
Shipping Company, Arab Airline Company, and the Arab Pipeline Company.
But, "the only joint venture to show any sign of progress has been the 
Arab Potash Company.
In 1958, the Arab Telecommunications Union was founded to coordinate 
and develop telecommunications between the Arab countries; to exchange 
technical aid and to encourage research.
In June 1962, five Arab League members (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Syria, and UAR) signed an agreement providing "for the establishment of 
a council for Arab Economic Union, and the result was the establishment 
—  only on paper —  of the Arab Common Market.
On February 13, 1964, an Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific 
Organization founded by the League to promote the ideals of Arab Cultural 
Unity and particularly to establish specialized institutes propagating 
Arab ideals and preparing research workers specializing in Arab
^Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 203.
•^Kamal s. Sayegh, Oil and Arab Regional Development (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 208.
•^Al-Ahram, June 19, 1962, p. 1.
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Civilization. Through this organization an Arab League Permanent Dele­
gation has been established at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, and may act 
on behalf of Arab states not having delegates at the UNESCO. Each member 
state submits an annual report on progress in education, cultural matters, 
and science. The first session of the. organization's General Conference 
was held in Cairo, July 7 - August 25, 1970. The organization includes:
Arab Regional Literacy Organization: Cairo.
Institute of Arab Research and Studies: Cairo.
Institute of Arabic Manuscripts: Cairo.
Permanent Bureau for Co-ordination of Arabization in the Arab 
World: Rabat.
Museum of Arab Culture: Cairo.
Arab States Industrial Development Centre: Cairo.
In 1965, an Arab Labor Organization was established for cooperation 
between member states in labor problems, unification of labor legislation 
and general conditions of work wherever possible, research, technical 
assistance, social insurance, and training. An Arab Air Carriers' 
Organization (AACO) was founded in 1965 to coordinate and promote coop­
eration in the activities of Arab airline companies, and in April 1965 the 
Arab States Broadcasting Union and the Federation of Arab News Agencies 
were founded to work together on the establishment of an Arab Central 
News Agency.
In 1967, an Arab Council for Civil Aviation was founded to control 
and coordinate the technical aspects of aviation between the Arab
countries.
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In 1968, the Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology 
(ASMO) was founded to assist in the establishment of national standard­
ization and metrology bodies in the Arab States, coordinate and unify 
specifications and standards; to unify technical terms and symbols, 
methods of testing, analysis, measurements, calibration and quality control 
systems; and to coordinate Arab activities in these areas with corre­
sponding internal efforts.
In 1969, the Arab Organization for Administrative Sciences was 
founded to develop administrative sciences and improve administrative 
machinery and financial affairs related to administration.
In 1971, the Arab Engineering Union was founded to cooperate with 
the Arab League in matters concerning the engineering profession; it 
holds a conference on scientific engineering studies every two years.
Also, conferences and congresses were sponsored by the League on 
medicine, the press, Islam, Arab history, oil concessions, the petroleum 
industry, banking, chemistry, pharmacy, law, dentistry, industrial 
development, tourism, engineering and many other subjects and professional 
fields.
Since its establishment in 1945, the membership of the Arab League 
grew in numbers as it became the only body in the world which represents 
as one nation nineteen independent states, extending from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Arabian Gulf. All proclaim their desire to be unified into 
a single nation, providing an organization through which the various 
states can work together by voluntary cooperation in all spheres.
The continuation of crisis in the Arab world since 1945, created a 
power struggle among the members of the Arab League, and led to the
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instability of the Arab world, thus hindering achievement of the objectives 
of the League through the unpredictable political movements and tensions 
of the member states. But, in spite of that the League survived as a 
"symbol of unity, an alliance of states joined together in deference to 
the widespread yearning for unity among the Arab people."19
So often the Arab League has been criticized for its failure to
make any progress in limiting the authority of its members, its failure in
liberating Palestine, and its failure in achieving an Arab unity for
which the League was created! But, the pact of the League provided for
the protection of the sovereignty of the individual states, and thus,
the members obtained an assurance against each other's aspiration, and
this made it impossible for the League to act decisively in the questions
of Palestine and in forcing decisions on its members. On the question
of unity, the pact of the League does not make any reference to eventual
Arab unity, as it emphasizes respect for the independence and sovereignty
of its members states through Article 9, which permits "close cooperation
9 nand stronger bonds.MZ,U Between member states which desire them in the 
future. Nevertheless, "the League has powerfully contributed to the 
strengthening of Arab feeling,"* 201 and has made significant progress with 
its economic, social, and cultural programs.
Many Arabs and foreigners praise the League for its role in 
promoting relations within the Arab world and for its settling of Arab
•^Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment (New York: 
Devin-Adair, Inc., 1958), p. 121.
20See Appendix B.
21 Jacques Berque, The Arabs-Their History and Future (New York: 
Frederick A. Praege, Inc., 1964), p. 249.
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disputes by means of arbitration and mediation. It should be noted that 
despite the League's pact which prohibits the intervention of one member 
in another's affairs, the League failed to prevent its members from 
interfering in the domestic affairs of other state members: Syria inter­
fered in the affairs of Lebanon and Jordan, Iraq interfered in the affairs 
of Kuwait, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan interfered in the affairs of 
Yemen, and for that the League showed its impotence in the Arab world 
mainly after its inability to play any useful role in the conflict over 
the Civil War in Yemen, which broke out in -September 1962 and into which 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan were soon drawn. Again, the League was 
useless in settling some of the Arab disputes, such as in 1963 when the 
border incident between Algeria and Morocco which occured in November 
1963 was mediated by the Organization of African Unity and when Morocco's 
king refused to accept an Arab League arbitration proposal.
Although the Arab League was concentrated on the problem of 
external threats including threats from Israel the League had failed to 
prevent the landing of American Marines in Lebanon, the return of. British 
troops in Jordan in 1958, and the taking of any action against Iran which 
annexed three Arabian gulf islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tumb, Leser Tumb) 
in November 30, 1974.
Despite its failure in Palestine, in the achievement of Arab unity, 
in settling some of Arab disputes, and in coordinating an action against 
external threats involving its members, the League's success or failure 
could be attributed to the willingness of its members to cooperate within 
its framework of cooperation. The Arab League will most likely remain 
ineffective politically, no matter how conditions change. The League
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will still be a place for Arab meetings to settle Arab disputes and coor­
dinate better relations among the Arab States, but, in the course of 
eventual Arab unity, the League is still too far from such a goal, as it 
wasn't designed to reach such a goal. As a League Publication declares, 
"The Arab League is not an end in the Arab aspirations for unity . . .  it 
is simply a regional organization including every Arab State from Morocco
to Iraq."22
^ The Arab World (New York: Arab Information. Center), p. 4.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of the century, the Arabs have made several 
attempts to achieve an Arab unity; they rid themselves of the Ottoman 
domination at the beginning of World War I, then they fought the Western 
Powers and achieved their independence.
In 1945, the Arabs established the League of Arab States as an 
organization through which the various Arab states could work together 
by voluntary cooperation in all spheres, and in hopes of preventing the 
creation of a Zionist state in Arab Palestine by strengthening their 
ties.
Since the Arabs experienced their defeats in Palestine, many 
important developments in the Arab World, both in the internal and 
external fields, played a role in shaping the goals and aspirations of 
the Arab leaders. Several attempts for Arab Unity were made, but all 
failed because of the instability in the Arab World, and also because 
of the lack of cooperation among the Arab leaders. Rivalries, disputes, 
hatred and mistrust existed among the Arab leaders, creating several 
alignments and conflicts, hindering the Arab League activities as the 
Arab leaders carried their disputes and rivalries to the League, and 
used the League to serve their purposes and interests.
The Arab League activities were and still are controlled and 
influenced by its members. They have been affected by the political
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divisions among its members as well as the conditions prevailing in the 
Arab world since its formation.
In the economic, cultural and social areas, the Arab League has 
been successful because of the willingness of its members to cooperate 
in such areas. In the political sphere, the unifying focus of the Arab 
League activity has been the common hostility of the member states 
towards Israel, The League has frequently rejected the legitimacy of 
Israel, while calling for a return of the Palestinian refugees to their 
former homes. And in addition the League has founded an Arab Joint 
Defense Council and the permanent Military Commission providing forums 
for cooperation on military activities related to the Arab Israeli 
Conflict.
Regardless of the League's failure in Palestine and in achieving 
an Arab unity, the Arab League will most likely continue to reflect the 
balance among Arab governments and the prevailing opinion in the Arab 
world no matter how conditions change. Despite their divisions, the 
Arabs themselves recognize the League as an enduring institution. It 
survived the disasters of the Palestine War 1948, and Abdullah's dis­
loyal conduct in annexing a large part of Palestine. Even Iraq, when it 
signed the Baghdad Pact, made much of its continued loyalty to the Arab 
League by attending some of its meetings and by participating in some of 
its programs. Egypt, despite its threats to withdraw, never carried 
them out,
Finally, the Arab League and Arab unity will remain the sacred 
hope for the Arabs and Arab nationalists. The League will continue to 
function voluntarily as long as the Arab leaders are willing to cooperate,
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and the drive for Arab unity will be carried on by the Arab leaders as 
all associate themselves with Arab unity and Arab nationalism.
APPENDIX A: THE ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL1
The chiefs and members of the Syrian, Trans-Jordanian, Iraqi, 
Lebanese and Egyptian delegations at the Preliminary Committee of the 
General Arab Conference,
Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab 
countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to 
improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and 
aspirations,
And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries,
Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944), 
in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, 
and have agreed as follows:
1. League of Arab States
A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which 
consent to join the League. It will have a council which will be known 
as the "Council of the League of Arab States," in which all participating 
states will be represented on an equal footing.
The object of the League will be to control the execution of the 
agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings 
which will strengthen the relations between those states; to coordinate 
their political plans so as to insure their cooperation, and protect 
their independence and sovereignty against every agression by suitable 
means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of 
the Arab countries.
The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have 
accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two 
member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their 
dispute to the Council for solution.' In this case the decisions of the 
Council of the League will be binding.
In no case will resort to force to settle ’a dispute between any 
two member states of the League be allowed. But every state shall be 
free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other
1Source: The Arab World [Arab Information Center, New York]
v (April 1959), 15-16.
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powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of 
the present dispositions.
In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be 
prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state 
be allowed.
The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to 
war between a member state of the League and any other member state or 
power, so as to reconcile them.
A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary 
Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the 
League and to examine the political questions which may be the object 
of agreement among Arab States.
2, Cooperation in Economic, Cultural, Social and Other Matters
A. The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall 
closely cooperate in the following matters:
(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e., commercial exchange, 
customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.
(2) Communications, i.e., railways, roads, aviation, navigation, 
posts and telegraphs.
(3) Cultural matters.
(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of 
judgments, extradition of criminals, etc.
(5) Social questions.
(6) Questions of public health.
B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will 
be formed in which the states which have participated in the Preliminary 
Committee will be represented. This subcommittee will prepare draft 
regulations for cooperation in the above matters, describing the extent 
and means of that collaboration.
C. A committee for coordination and editing will be formed whose 
object will be to control the work of the other subcommittees, to 
coordinate that part of the work which is accomplished, and to prepare 
drafts of agreements which will be submitted to the various governments.
D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work the 
Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittee 
as a preliminary step toward the holding of a General Arab Conference.
3. Consolidation of These Ties in the Future
While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the 
Committee hopes that Arab States will be able in the future to
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consolidate that step by other steps, especially if postwar events should 
result in institutions which bind various Powers more closely together.
4. A Special Resolution Concerning Lebanon
The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize 
their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its 
present frontiers, which the governments of the above States have 
already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent 
policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of 
October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies
5. A Special Resolution Concerning Palestine
A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an 
important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in 
Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability
in the Arab World.
The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the 
British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, 
the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for 
Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would 
constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization 
of peace and security.
The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of 
Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of their 
legitimate aim and the safeguarding of their just rights.
The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting 
the woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European 
dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be 
confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and 
aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another 
injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of 
various religions and denominations.
B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the 
Arab Governments and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard 
the lands of the Arabs of Palestine shall be referred to the committee 
of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and 
to submit the results of that examination to the Preliminary Committee 
in its next meeting.
In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I Uni­
versity at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).
APPENDIX B: PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES1
HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC;
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF TRANS-JORDAN;
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA;
HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC;
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT;
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE YEMEN;
Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties 
which link the Arab States;
And Anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of 
respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to 
direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, 
the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the 
realization of their aspirations and hopes;
And responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab
lands;
Having agreed to conclude a Pact to that end and having appointed 
as their representatives the persons whose names are listed hereinafter, 
have agreed upon the following provisions:
Article 1. The League of Arab States is composed of the independent 
Arab States which have signed this Pact.
Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the 
League. If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be 
deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the 
Council at the first meeting held after submission of the request.
Article 2. The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the 
relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies 
in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their 
independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs 
and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the 
close cooperation of the member states, with due regard to the organiza­
tion and circumstances of each state, on the following matters:




A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, 
customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry.
B. Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, 
navigation, telegraphs, and posts.
C. Cultural affairs.




Article 3. The League shall possess a Council composed of the represen­
tatives of the member states of the League; each state shall have a 
single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.
It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of 
the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agree­
ments which the member states have concluded on the questions enumerated 
in the preceding article, or on any other questions.
It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means 
by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be 
created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and 
regulate economic and social relations.
Article 4. For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be 
set up a special committee in which the member states of the League 
shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task 
of laying down the principles and extent of cooperation. Such 
principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented 
to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the 
aforesaid states.
Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the 
work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the 
conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to 
participate and the rules governing such representation.
Article 5. Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising 
between two or more member states of the League is prohibited. If there 
should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's 
independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties 
to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this 
difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and 
obligatory.
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In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen 
shall not participate ii\ the deliberations and decisions of the Council.
The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to 
lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third 
state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.
Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by 
majority vote.
Article 6. In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state 
against a member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened 
with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council.
The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures 
necessary to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member 
state, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.
If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state 
attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that 
state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request 
the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the fore­
going paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to 
communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall 
have the right to request the convocation of the Council.
Article 7. Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all 
member states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only 
upon those states which have accepted them.
In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in 
each member state according to its respective basic laws.
Article 8. Each member state shall respect the systems of government 
established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive 
concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action 
calculated to change established systems of government.
Article 9. States of the League which desire to establish closer coopera 
tion and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude 
agreements to that end.
Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in 
the future between a member state and another state shall not be binding 
or restrictive upon other members.
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Article 10. The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is esta­
blished in Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place 
it may designate.
Article 11. The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session 
twice a year, in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary 
session upon the request of two member states of the League whenever the 
need arises.
Article 12. The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which 
shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an 
appropriate number of officials.
The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a 
majority of two-thirds of the states of the League. The Secretary- 
General, with the approval of the Council shall appoint the Assistant 
Secretaries and the principal officials of the League.
The Council of the League shall establish an administrative 
regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters 
relating to the Staff.
The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the 
Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary.
Article 13. The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget 
of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before 
the beginning of each fiscal year.
Article 14. The members of the Council of the League as well as the 
members of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in 
the administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions.
The building occupied by the organs of the League shall be 
inviolable.
Article 15. The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the 
invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall 
be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.
The representatives of the member states of the League shall 
alternately assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary 
sessions.
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Article 16. Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a 
majority vote of the Council shal] be sufficient to make enforceable 
decisions on the following matters:
A. Matters relating to personnel,
B. Adoption of the budget of the League.
C. Establishment of the administrative regulation for Council, 
the committee, and the Secretariat-General.
D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.
Article 17. Each member state of the League shall deposit with the 
Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded 
in the future between itself and another member state of the League 
or a third state.
Article 18. If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, 
it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such 
withdrawal is to go into effect.
The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to 
fulfill its obligations under this Pact as having become separated 
from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of 
the states, not counting the state concerned.
Article 19. This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of 
the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer 
and stronger the ties between the member states, to create an Arab 
Tribunal of Arbitration, and to regulate the relations of the League 
with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee 
security and peace.
Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session 
following the session in which the motion was initiated.
If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at 
such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the 
provisions of the preceding article.
Article 20. This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to 
the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become operative 
as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the Secretary- 
General has received the instruments of ratification from four states.
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This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on 
this 8th day of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22, 
1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safekeeping of the 
Secretariat-General.
An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.
[Here follow the signatures]
(1) Annex Regarding Palestine
Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had 
become detached from that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to 
be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state.
The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be 
settled by the parties concerned.
However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own 
affairs, the Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision 
for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.
Her international existence and independence in the legal sense 
cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence 
of the other Arab countries.
Although the outward manifestations of this independence have 
remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be 
allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council 
of the League.
The states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore 
of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine 
and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the 
Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab 
representative from Palestine to take part in its work.
(2) Annex Regarding Cooperation with Countries Which Are Not Members 
of the Council of the League
Whereas the member states of the League will have to deal in the 
Council as well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and 
affect the Arab world at large;
And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations 
of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to 
work toward their realization;
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Now, therefore, it particularly behooves the states signatory to 
the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when con­
sidering the admission of those countries to participation in the 
committees referred to in the Pact, that it should spare no effort to 
learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that 
it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding 
of their future with all the political means at its disposal.
(3) Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League
The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His 
Excellency Abdul-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, to be Secretary-General of the 
League of Arab States.
This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the League 
shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretary-General.
APPENDIX C: JOINT DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
TREATY BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE ARAB LEACUE1
The Governments of:
THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC
THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC
THE KINGDOM OF EGYPT
THE MOTAWAKILITE KINGDOM OF YEMEN
In view of the desire of the above-mentioned Governments to consol­
idate relations between the States of the Arab League; to maintain their 
independence and their mutual heritage; in accordance with the desire of 
their peoples, to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the 
maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the 
Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter, together with the aims 
of the said Pacts; and to consolidate stability and security and provide 
means of welfare and development in the countries.
The following government delegates of . . .  , having been duly 
accredited and fully authorized by their respective governments, approve 
the following:
Article 1. The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize 
peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their inter­
national disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern 
relations among themselves or with other powers.
Article 2. The Contracting States consider any [act of] armed aggression 
made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed 
against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, 
individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the 
aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is
•̂ -Signed by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen on June 17, 
1950; by Iraq on February 2, 1951; and by Jordan on February 16, 1952. 
Source: The Arab World, v (April 1959), 18-19.
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made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps 
available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and 
restore security and peace. In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab 
League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League 
Council and U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of 
aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.
Article 3. At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty 
the Contracting States shall hold consultations whenever there are reason­
able grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence, 
or security of any one of the parties is threatened. In the event of the 
threat of war or the existence of an international emergency, the 
Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and 
defensive measures, as the situation may demand.
Article 4. The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above 
obligations and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating 
and coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to 
their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of 
defense to repulse the said armed aggression.
Article 5. A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of 
the General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed 
to draw up plans of joint defense and their implementation. The duties of 
the Permanent Military Commission which are set forth in an Annex attached 
to this Treaty, include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of 
cooperation and participation mentioned in Article 4. The Permanent 
Military Commission shall submit to the Joint Defense Council, provided 
hereunder in Article 6, reports dealing with questions within its province.
Article 6. A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab 
League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the 
implementation of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this 
Treaty. It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the 
Permanent Military Commission referred to in Article 5. The Joint Defense 
Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers 
of the Contracting States or their representatives. Decisions taken by 
a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States.
Article 7. The Contracting States, in order to'fulfill the aims of this 
Treaty, and to bring security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and 
iii an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate 
in the development of their economies and the explication of their natural 
resources; to facilitate the exchange of their respective agricultural and 
industrial products; and generally to organize and coordinate their 
economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab agreements 
to realize such aims.
61
Article 8. An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of 
economic affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed 
by the Contracting States to submit recommendations for the realization 
of all such aims as are set forth in the performance of its duties, seek 
the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs 
referred to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.
Article 9. The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and 
indivisible part of it.
Article 10. The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international 
agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, 
nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary 
to the aims of this Treaty.
Article 11. No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is 
intended to affect, any of the rights or obligations developing upon the 
Contracting States from the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities 
borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of inter­
national peace and security.
Article 12. After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification 
of this Treaty, any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it, 
providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat-General 
of the Arab League. The Secretariat-General of the League shall inform 
the other Contracting States of such notice.
Article 13. This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State 
according to the constitutional procedure of its own government. The 
Treaty shall come into force for the Ratifying States 15 days after the 
receipt by the Secretariat-General of the instruments of ratification 
from at least four States. This Treaty is drafted in Arabic in Cairo on 
April 13, 1950. One signed copy shall be deposited with the Secretariat- 
General of the Arab League; equally authentic copies shall be transmitted 
to each of the Contracting States.
MILITARY ANNEX
1. The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of 
the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of 
the Arab League, shall undertake the following:
(a) in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans 
to deal with all anticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be 
launched against one or more of the Contracting States or their armed
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forces, such plans to be based on the principles determined by the Joint 
Defense Council;
(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the 
Contracting States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance 
with military exigencies and the potentialities of each State;
(c) to submit, proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the 
forces of the Contracting States is so far as their equipment, organization, 
and training are concerned; so that they may keep pace with modern 
military methods and development; and for the unification and coordination 
of all such forces;
(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural, 
industrial, and other resources of all Contracting States in favor of the 
inter-Arab military effort and joint defense;
(e) to organize the exchange of training missions between the 
Contracting States for the preparation of plans, participation in military 
exercises and maneuvers and the study of their results, recommendations 
for the improvement of methods to ensure close cooperation in the field, 
and for the general improvement of the forces of all the Contracting 
states;
(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military 
potentialities of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played 
by the forces of each in the joint military effort;
(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each
of the Contracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, 
might be asked to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies 
of such other Contracting States as might be operating on its territory.
2. The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or 
permanent subcommittees from among its own members to deal with any of the 
matters falling within its jurisdiction. It may also seek the advice of 
any experts whose views on certain questions are deemed necessary.
3. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports 
on the results of its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council 
provided for in Article 6 of this Treaty, as well as an annual report 
giving full particulars of its work and studies during the year.
4. The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its head­
quarters in Cairo but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission 
may specify. The Commission shall elect its Chairman for two years; he 
may be reelected. Candidates for the Chairmanship shall hold at least 
the rank of a high commanding officer. Each member of the Commission 
must have as his original nationality that of the Contracting State he 
represents
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5. In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces 
shall be entrusted to the Contracting State possessing the largest military 
force taking actual part in field operations, unless, by unanimous 
agreement, the Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted in directing military 
operations by a Joint Staff.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY OF JOINT DEFENSE 
AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES 
AND TO THE MILITARY ANNEX2
A consultative military organization shall be composed of the Chiefs 
of Staff of the Contracting States to supervise the Permanent Military 
Commission provided by Article 5 of the Treaty and to direct it in all 
the functions specified in Article 1 of the Military Annex.
The reports and proposals of the Permanent Military Commission shall 
be submitted to the Consultative Military Organization before submitting 
them to the Joint Defense Council provided for by Article 6 of the Treaty.
The Consultative Military Organization shall submit its reports and 
proposals regarding its functions to the Joint Defense Council that it 
may examine them and take the necessary decisions.
The present Protocol shall have the same force as the Treaty and its 
Appendix [Military Annex] as regards the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of 
the Treaty and Article 3 of the Military Appendix [Annex].
2Signed on February 2, 1951 at the 13th session of the League 
Council. Text from League of Arab States Treaty Series (no date, no 
place of publication), p. 18, with change of "Common" to "Joint" in 
Joint Defense; "Collaboration" to "Cooperation" in Economic Cooperation.
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